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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I.M.L. FREIGHT, INC; GARRETT 
FREIGHTLINES, INC., and 
TRANSCON LINES, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
C. N. OTTOSEN, Commissioner of 
Insurance of the State of Utah, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION of the State 
of Utah, and VERNON ROMNEY, 
Attorney general of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
Case No, 
13973 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action to determine 
the relationship between the Utah No Fault Act and the Utah 
Workmen Compensation Act; and to also determine the legality of 
the Insurance Commissioner's application of the Utah No Fault 
Act to accidents occurring outside of the State of Utah. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before the Court, sitting without 
a jury. The Court found that the exclusive and only remedy that 
an employee has against his employer, where injury occurs while 
in the course and scope of employment, is Workmen Compensation 
and that the employee has no remedy under the Utah No Fault 
Act against his employer. 
The Trial Court further held that the Utah No Fault 
Act has no application to accidents which occur outside of the 
State of Utah and that the Department of Insurance's regulations 
to the contrary have no legality. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request this Court to affirm the judgment 
of the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Utah No Fault law became effective on January 1, 
1974. (U.C.A. 31-41-1 et.seq.) Pursuant to the said Act, the 
Utah State Department of Insurance promulgated certain rules 
and regulations. (Exhibits 1 and 2.) 
The Utah Workmen Compensation law which has been in effect 
since 1917, states that Workmen Compensation is the exclusive 
remedy of an employee against his employer and shall be in place 
of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law 
or otherwise. (U.C.A. 35-1-1 et.seq.) 
-2-
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Respondents are interstate motor carriers employing 
numerous truck drivers. Respondents have received numerous 
claims by their employees against them claiming No Fault coverage 
benefits. Inasmuch as the statutes provide for severe penalties 
for non-compliance with the No Fault Act, Respondents filed 
the said action for declaratory relief. 
The Department of Insurance claims that the Respondents1 
employees are covered by the No Fault Act and are entitled to 
the remedies of the No Fault Act even against their own employers 
regardless of the Workmen Compensation Statutes. 
Respondents claim that their employee-drivers have no 
rights under the No Fault Act against their employers but that 
their exclusive and only remedy is Workmen Compensation. 
In addition, the Insurance Commissioner has promulgated 
regulations applying the Utah No Fault Law to accidents occurring 
outside of the State of Utah as well as those within the state. 
Respondents' claim that the No Fault Act applies only 
to those accidents occurring within the State of Utah. 
Appellants further claim the Trial Court erred in not 
requiring the Respondents to exhaust their administrative 
remedies before seeking relief from the Court. Appellants, at 
a date prior to the trial, moved for a dismissal upon the same 
grounds. The Motion for Dismissal was denied. Appellants 
petitioned the Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal. The 
Petition was denied. Appellants renewed their Motion to Dismiss 
-3-
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at the time of trial. The motion was denied. 
Respondents claim that the Trial Court did not err in 
denying such motion in that this matter concerns a controversy 
over issues of law, and the application, interpretation and 
construction of statutes, and the excessive use of administra-
tive power or abuse thereof. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS1 
MOTION TO DISMISS WHEREIN DEFENDANTS CLAIMED THAT 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES. 
While it is true that a person must exhaust his 
administrative remedies before resorting to the Courts, this is 
not true in controversies over issues of law, interpretation 
or construction of statutes, questions of constitutionality 
of statutes, or the excess use of administrative power or abuse 
thereof. These particular matters are the province of the 
judiciary and for Court determination. 
The general rule is stated in 2 AmJur 2d Section 654, 
Administrative Law, as follows: 
It is for the Courts, not the administrative 
agencies, to lay down the governing principals 
of law and to determine what action is within 
or without the law. This is a judicial function 
and judicial review of questions of law may be 
held required by the Constitution and beyond 
the legislative power to impair. Accordingly, 
with few exceptions, Courts will review challenged 
action of an administrative agency to determine 
if it conforms with the law or is affected by an 
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error oi law or if fho law 1MS boon properly applied 
by the agency and it is field that questions of law, 
at least 'clear-cut1 questions of law are review-
able or are for determination by the Court generally 
upon its own independent judgment but according 
appropriate weiglit^Eo tKe decision of the ndminisl r.i-
ti ve agency, 
ri ie same soi irce at Sect3 on 656 states: 
The interpretation of a statute or regi ilation 
involves a question of law and statutory con : 
struction is the function of the Courts. . 
The Court will determine the meaning of the 
words o f a statute and 2 ts intent especially 
where the matter involves an accomodate on 
between conflicting policies, 
*
11
 ''
re ;lt
 Northern _Railroacl Company vs. Mei chants 
Elevator Company, 259 U.S. ?KS, 1/ '..Cf. '1771 66 L.IJI 0<n, Che 
i! i Supreme u iiiiiii in in iliii i M M I I I In iii | nr i sdi d i < ui hi c o n s t r u e 
.i t a r l l i p r i m lui c o n s i d e r a t i o n ol I lie d i s p u t e d q u e s t ion 1 
construction by the Interstate Commerce Commission. In Mi 
Iv'-n* ^i ^ tion .>f the construction of a tariff 
is deemed a question of law; and where the question 
concerns an interstate tariff it is one of Federal 
** !* the parties proper] y preserve their rights, 
a construction giver, by any Court, whether it be 
federal or state,-may ultimately be reviewed by 
this Court either on writ of error or on w ri t of 
certiorari; and thereby uniformity in construction 
jn.i) be secured• Hence, the attainment of uniformity 
does not require that in eier\ (ase whete • K* 
construction of a tariff j in dispute, there M,.. > , 
\\a a i t r ^ l i n n M r \, T^-titr* * ] < C o m m i S ^ i ' H l 
-.\ ' u v i i o i d s vb. United S t a t e s , <., « f-
8 0 0 . : t . *• , 
an adm: : ^ i ? d t n o l ' i u » - , ^ w ^-% ! .; » a* t - *v , u l i s ^ - r e 
in (I mi tab! <x matter ui ±<x* " H U I L ui uui uue conclusion, 
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so that a contrary conclusion by the officer would be arbitrary 
and not binding upon the Courts. 
In regards to rules and regulations promulgated by 
an administrative agency, the general rule is stated in 2 AmJur 
2d Section 588, Administrative Law, as follows: 
Regulations of an administrative agency are 
addressed to and set a standard of conduct 
for all to whom their terms apply, and if 
valid operate as such in advance of the 
imposition of sanctions upon any particular 
individual, and have the force of law before 
their sanctions are evoked as well as after. 
Accordingly, it is recognized that a determination 
of administrative authority may be made at the 
behest of one so immediately and injured by a 
regulation claimed to be invalid that his need 
is sufficiently compelling to justify judicial 
intervention even before the completion of the 
administrative process. (Citing: Eccles vs. 
Peoplefs Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 92 L.Ed. 784, 68 
S.CJt 641.) 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PROPER REMEDY 
A Declaratory Judgment Proceeding is the recognized 
remedy for the determination, interpretation and construction 
of administrative rules and regulations as well as statutes. 
22 AmJur 2d Section 31, Declaratory Judgments, states: 
Declaratory Judgment Proceedings have been 
considered particularly useful in determining 
the rights of the individual vis-a-vis public 
authorities and administrative agencies. A 
judicial determination as to the power of public 
regulatory agencies and the validity of their 
rules and regulations enables the private 
individual to avoid uncertainty as to his rights 
and duties and to avoid the risks of civil and 
criminal liability without requiring him to use 
the more cumbersome writs of certiorari mandames 
quowarranto, or prohibition. . .accordingly, 
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Declaratory Judgment Procedure is avanaoi 
determine the powers and duties of various 
governmental agencies and officers, as well as 
*•- iet ermine the validity and construction r 
, , ;
 c +• Y\*I t- -i t , > K . i s n l Q t i n n ^ • * < r p s 01111 i o * < 
In Namro Holding Corporation vs. New York, . ' 
/t+* • '
 K< •* «« ^*oi--itM-t > ••• • • appeal ' ; JI;I 
an . : • 
declaratory action challenging the a^pl »v abi , • i v >. > les 
UTAH LAW 
I I I j i l i IIMIH i " mi1 , i s I n i 1 w i ( III 1 In i[<Mir i ,i 1 II «ii t J I en! 
ab o v e I n f: a c t, o n e i s g i v e n a s t a tu 1: o r y r i g h t t o p u r s u e 
declaratory relief where hi s rights have been affected by a 
finance, contrac 1: • ::)i f:i a nchi se. 11 1 1 1 It:a I I Code 
Ann o t ii T -.! * s -;. 3 - 2 , c o n c e r n i n g I) e c 1 a r a t o r y Ju d gm e n t s, i t 
Any person interested under a deed, wi 11, or . 
written contract, or whose rights, status or 
other legal relations are affected by a 
statute, municipal ordinance, contract or 
franchise, may have determined any question 
of construction or validity arising under the 
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or 
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, 
status or other legal relations thereunder. 
*
 n 1[J t a l ]|L Ho t: e 1 C onip any v s . 11 ldu s 1: i j a l COITUTI i ss ' i oi l, Il 0 7 
T
 * * • * ~ ' 1 511 P 2 d 4 6 7 , t h e I J t a h S i I p r e in e C o u r t: q u o 1: e d w :i t h a p p r o v a 1 
•
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 - wi ng from Federal
 B-Admi nistrativ e haw b^ V on Baui , 
Sect i I'm 7 1, as fol 1 ows: 
The nature of the administrate ve process ii I 
execute rig a statutory scheme requires that 
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administrative agencies not only determine 
the administrative questions involved, but 
apply the law in the first instance as well-
that is, that they also venture an initial 
decision on the judicial questions. Otherwise, 
as a practical matter, the agencies could not 
function. ... A 'Decision* or 'Finding1 by 
an administrative agency upon a judicial 
question is never a binding decision, for 
under the doctrines of supremacy of law and 
the separation of powers a binding decision 
of a question of law affecting private rights 
may only be made by an appropriate Court acting 
judicially. Thus, although as a practical or 
procedural matter an administrative agency must 
venture a decision upon such a question of law, 
such questions are always open for independent 
judgment of an appropriate Court acting: judicially. . .. 
And~a binding decision on a simple judicial question, 
such as a question of statutory construction, may 
only be made by an appropriate Court acting judicially. 
In Union Pacific Railroad Company vs. Structural Steel 
and Forge Company, 9 Utah 2d 318, 344 P.2d 157, the railroad 
brought an action against the shipper of steel goods over a rate 
tariff controversy. The railroad made a motion to submit the 
questions of tariff interpretation to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission which Order was granted. The Supreme Court of Utah 
held that this was error and that the question was for the Court. 
The Supreme Court stated: 
Since the words in the tariff are used in their 
ordinary meanings, their construction is a matter 
of law; uniformity in that construction can be 
guaranteed by the Supreme Court. . .. The State 
Court can apply the legal construction to a state 
cause of action. 
Parker vs. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848, was 
an action for a Declaratory Judgment as to the legality of 
voluntary sterilization. The argument was made that the plaintiff 
-8-
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had not vet been damaged so coul d not: seek action, as to the 
,.i|)ij:il in i dli mi I ill)1 ni1 I lie s l a l i u t r l o I liciii ||i we've!',, Iii*1 '" 111) i mi i mi 
Court he] d otherwise stati ng: 
As to Declaratory J iidgiiieiit, the very purpose •" '• 
o£ that statute was to provide a means for 
.
 s e c u r i n g an adjudication without the necessi ty 
of someone having to suffer damage or get into 
• ' "• serious difficulty before lie could seek to have 
hi s rights determined in Coi irt 
b PPI ic a BII IT i oi ;" i : i ii1 i o • :: kSB fli "i B A R 
The case at bar :i n v olves pure questions of ] aw and 
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every case , a re eiiip 1 oyees of Resp0nden 1:s Respondei 11:s c] a::i 11 
that sue] i :i 1 i t erpretat ion cannot be made s:i nee the 1 1 tal 1 "I fox kmen 
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other ci vi 1 ] lability whatsoever,, at common law 01 o therw i se , 
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emplover 
Also , the case at: ba r concerns the unautl lorii z e d 
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ments to their No Fault Insurance policies providi ng such 
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out-of-state coverage. However, Respondents allege that the 
Utah No Fault Act specifically restricts No Fault application 
to accidents which occur inside of the State of Utah and, 
therefore, the Insurance Commissioner has promulgated a rule 
far beyond the statute and beyond his authority. 
The above conflicts are clearly conflicts of law and 
deal with issues of law. These issues are for judicial deter-
mination by the Court. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS1 CITED AUTHORITIES 
The Appellants cite Utah Insurance Code 31-4-1 for 
the proposition that a hearing must be held by the Insurance 
Commissioner. However, that Code provides only that the 
Insurance Commissioner "may" hold a hearing which he deems 
proper. It states that he "shall" hold a hearing only if 
required by a provision of the Code or upon written demand 
by any person aggrieved by the act of the Commissioner. In 
any case, the present issues are not proper issues to be 
determined by an administrative body but only by a judicial 
Court. 
Appellants cite Pacific Intermountain Express Company 
vs. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549, and 
Walker Bank § Trust Company vs. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 
P.2d 592, apparently for the proposition that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies must be made. However, Appellants 
-10-
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failed to point out that in the Pacific Intermountain Express 
case there was a statute which gave the Supreme Court of Utah 
the exclusive and sole jurisdiction to review an administrative 
review and, furthermore, the later of the two cases, Walker 
Bank § Trust Company vs. Taylor, supra, specifically recognized 
that questions of law were to be determined by a Court and that 
an administrative hearing was not necessary in such cases. The 
Supreme Court stated: 
We agree that, under most circumstances, exhaustion 
of administrative remedies is required before legal 
action may be taken. However, this only applies 
where the discretion of an administrative officer 
or body, acting in pursuant to statutory directive, 
is in question. It does not apply when, as here, 
the administrative officer or body, acts without 
the scope of his or its defined statutory authority. 
The question here involved, being strictly one of 
law. is for the Courts and an appeal to the Board , oar<"
of Examiners would have been futile and useless. 
It is respectfully submitted that the issues at bar 
concern strictly questions of law and actions by the administra-
tive officer or body beyond the scope of their defined statutory 
authority, and, therefore, these questions were for determination 
by the Courts. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT AN 
EMPLOYEE'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER 
IS WORKMEN COMPENSATION AND THAT AN EMPLOYEE HAS 
NO REMEDY AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER UNDER THE NO FAULT 
ACT. 
Workmen Compensation, by statute, is the exclusive and 
only remedy an employee has against its employer, when injured 
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in the course and scope of his employment. And, an employee 
• % 
cannot maintain any civil action of any kind against his employer * 
or fellow employee. Utah Code Annotated 35-1-60 reads as follows: m 
Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or employee - Occupational disease excepted.-
 — 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the I 
provision of this title for injuries sustained by • 
an employee, whether resulting in death or not, 
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer fl 
and shall be the exclusive remedy against any fl 
officer, agent or employee of the employer and the 
liabilities of the employer imposed by this act~~sTiall • 
be in place of any and all other civil liability I 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such * 
employee or to his spouse, widow, children, parents 
dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representa- I 
tives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on 1 
account of any accident or injury or death, in any 
way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred 1 
by such employee in the course of or because of or | 
arising out of his employment, and no action at 
law may be maintained against an employer or against m 
any officer, agent or employee of the employer based I 
upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. * 
Nothing in this section however, shall prevent an 
employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim I 
with the Industrial Commission of Utah for compensa- 1 
tion in those cases within the provisions of the 
Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended. I 
(emphasis added) | 
Therefore, in Utah, specifically by statute, an employee . 
cannot sue his employer at common law or otherwise, nor maintain * 
any action at law, but the liability of the employer is in place 1 
of all other civil liability. The Compensation Act is the exclu-
sive remedy of an employee who is injured on the job. ] 
This same principle is recognized universally by all . 
jurisdictions having Workmen Compensation laws, 3 Larson, The Law • 
of Workmen Compensation, Section 65.00 (1974), which work, j 1 
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incidentally, has been referred to by the Utah Supreme Court 
as the "recognized authority on the subject," "(Kennecott vs. 
Anderson and Industrial Commission, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 
217) states in Volume III at Section 65.00 the following: 
The compensation remedy is exclusive of all 
other remedies by the employee of his dependents 
against the employer and insurance carrier for 
the same injury, if the injury falls within the 
coverage formula for the Act. . .." 
This same principle is recognized where other statutory 
law may give protection in absence of Workmen Compensation. 
The same authority states in Section 65.10 at p.41: 
The exclusiveness rule relieves the employer 
not only of such common law liability, but also 
of statutory liability under such enactments as 
a State or Federal Employer's Liability Act, a 
Defective Machinery Act, an Automobile Owner's 
Liability Act, or a Scaffold Act. Attempts to 
get around the exclusiveness bar have also been 
unsuccessful when they took the form of asserting 
that the action against the employer based on 
contract rather than tort, or that it was an 
action in rem against a ship rather than an 
action iii personam against the employer. 
The above is also the rule within the Federal system where 
the question often arises as to whether or not a Federal employee 
may sue the United States under the Federal Torts Claims Act (or 
other similar acts) or, if such employee is compelled to find 
remedy under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act, the latter 
being similar to Utah's Compensation Act. Those cases all turn 
on whether or not the employee was in the course and scope of his 
Federal employment at the time of his injury. If he was, then 
his only remedy would be Workmen Compensation. But if he was not 
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on the job at the time, then he can sue under the other applicable 
Federal Acts. The Federal Employee's Compensation Act specifi-
cally states the same to be the MexclusiveM remedy of a Federal 
employee against his employer, the Federal Government. 
In United States vs. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 87 S.Ct. 382 
(1966), the United States Supreme Court aptly clarifies the issue. 
In that case, a Federal prisoner, who performed work within the 
Federal Compensation Act, was injured and sued the Federal 
Government under the Federal Torts Claims Act. But, the United 
States Supreme Court held that such person's only remedy was 
the Compensation Act. An argument was made in that case that 
the Federal Torts Claims Act had been passed twelve years after 
the Compensation Act and was meant to supplement or change it. 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and stated: 
Indeed, to hold that the 1946 Federal Tort 
Claims Act was designed to have such a supple-
mental effect would be to hold that injured 
prisoners are given greater protection than 
all other government employees who are pro-
tected exclusively by the Federal Employee's 
Compensation Act, a congressional purpose 
not easy to infer. 
In Granada vs. United States, 356 F.2d 837 (C.A.2d 
1966), a case similar to the Demko case, supra, the Court of 
Appeals stated: 
And it would now seem to be well settled 
that if a remedy is available under the 
Federal Employee1s Compensation Act for in-
juries sustained in the course of employment, 
this remedy is exclusive, and no concurrent 
remedy exists under the Federal Torts Claims 
-14-
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Act, the Jones Act, the Suits in Admiralty 
Act, or the Public Vessels Act. 
In United States vs. Browning, 359 F.2d 937 (C.A.10th 
Utah, 1966), a Federal employee was injured in an automobile 
accident with another government vehicle, after her working hours, 
and while she was leaving Hill Air Force Base. She sued the 
Federal Government under the Federal Torts Claims Act claiming 
that at the time of the accident she was not in the scope of her 
employment. The entire case depended upon the factual evidence 
as to whether or not she was in the scope of her employment at 
the time. If she was in the scope of her employment, her exclu-
sive remedy was Workmen Compensation. If she was not in the 
scope of her employment, her remedy was that remedy available to 
any other person, in that case, the Federal Torts Claims Act, 
The Court stated: 
There would appear to be no question but that 
the Federal Employee's Compensation Act is 
the exclusive remedy for employees who come 
within its provisions. . .. 
UTAH LAW 
Utah's Workmen Compensation Act is similar to the 
Federal Employee's Compensation Act as to exclusiveness of 
remedy. In fact, the Utah Act is even more clear. The said Act 
states essentially that: 
(it) shall be the exclusive remedy against an 
employer. . .or employee. . .. 
(the) liabilities of the employer imposed by 
this act shall be in place of any and all other 
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civil liability whatsoever, at common law 
or otherwise. 
no action at law may be maintained against 
an employer. . .or employee. (U.C.A. 35-1-60) 
The Federal Compensation Act simply states that the 
11
. . .liability of the United States. . .is exclusive and instead 
of all other liability of the United States. . . ." 5 U.S.C.A., 
Section 8116(c). 
In Utah-Idaho Central Railroad Company vs. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 84 Utah 364, 35 P.2d 842 (1934) a railroad 
employee was injured in a rail accident. He sued his employer 
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, claiming he was 
working interstate at the time. The Federal Government claimed 
he was working intrastate only, and his exclusive remedy was 
Workmen Compensation. It was argued that since the employee was 
also seeking Workmen Compensation he was estopped from suing 
the Federal Government. The Utah Supreme Court, consistent with 
the principles stated above, recognized that the employee had only 
one right and the only question was "which right.tf The Court 
stated: 
Pope here did not have two remedies consistent 
or inconsistent or co-existing on the same state 
of facts, or a choice between different modes of 
procedure and relief allowed by the law on the 
same state of facts. If his injury occurred 
while engaged in interstate commerce, he had but 
one legal remedy and that under the Federal 
Employerfs Liability Act. On the other hand, 
if his injury was occasioned while engaged in 
intra-state commerce, as alleged by the company. . . 
then his only legal remedy was under the Workmen 
Compensation ActT 
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The Court then concluded that his only remedy was 
Workmen Compensation under the facts. 
Therefore, the law is quite clear that Workmen Compen-
sation is the exclusive and only remedy that an employee has 
against his employer when in the scope of employment, and this 
is true as to other statutory rights as well as common law rights. 
This is what the Utah Statute specifically states and this is 
what the law of Workmen Compensation stands for in the State of 
Utah and in other jurisdictions. 
UTAH NO FAULT ACT 
The Utah No Fault Act makes no exception to the above 
rule. That Act, U.C.A. 31-41-1 et.seq., does not replace, amend 
or change the Workmen Compensation laws of Utah in any way. That 
Act does not tamper with the exclusiveness of remedy provision 
of the Workmen Compensation laws in any way. That Act basically 
provides that the owner of a motor vehicle must provide coverage 
to cover the insured and persons occupying his vehicle and 
pedestrians struck by his vehicle pursuant to the No Fault Act. 
However, Appellants claim that the No Fault Act affects 
the relationship between employees and their employers, the 
Workmen Compensation laws of Utah, and eliminates the exclusiveness 
of Workmen Compensation. Appellants place their entire argument 
upon one section of the No Fault Act, Utah Code Annotated, 31-41-7(3] 
which states: 
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(3) The benefits payable to any injured person 
under Section 31-41-6 shall be reduced by: 
(a) Any benefits which that person receives 
or is entitled to receive as a result of an 
accident covered in this Act under any Work-
men Compensation plan or any similar statutory 
plan;.... 
However, the meaning of the above section is quite clear 
when kept within the context of the entire No Fault Act and within 
the context of the Workmen Compensation Act. There will be 
occasions when an employee is injured, while on the job, which 
will entitle him to Workmen Compensation from his own employer, 
as well as No Fault benefits from another source. For instance, 
if a truck driver is making a delivery and while crossing a 
street is hit by a car, the delivery man is entitled to Workmen 
Compensation from his own employer, but is also entitled to 
No Fault benefits from the owner of the car which hit him. And, 
according to the above quoted provision of the No Fault law, 
while the delivery man may collect Workmen Compensation from his 
employer and also No Fault benefits from the owner of the car 
which hit him, the No Fault benefits will be reduced by the 
Workmen Compensation benefits received. This is the purpose of 
the above section. The above section does not say that the 
delivery man may recover No Fault from his own employer. This 
would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Workmen Compen-
sation Act and its exclusive remedy provisions. 
This reasoning is verified by the very next section 
found in the No Fault Act, Utah Code Annotated, 31-41-9, which 
-18-
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states: 
(1) No person for whom direct benefit coverage 
is provided for in this Act shall be allowed to 
maintain a cause of action for general damages 
arising out of personal injuries alleged to have 
been caused by an automobile accident except 
where there has been caused by this accident any 
one or more of the following: 
(a) Death; 
(b) Dismemberment of fracture; 
(c) Permanent disability; 
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) Medical expenses to a person in 
excess of $500.00. 
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle with respect 
to which security is required by this Act who 
fails to have such security in effect at the time 
of an accident shall have no immunity from tort 
liability and shall be personally liable for the 
payment of the benefits provided for under Section 
31-41-6. 
If No Fault is said to replace or change the Workmen 
Compensation Act as claimed by Appellants, then the above section 
would mean that an employee could always sue his employer in any 
case for Mdeath, dismemberment or fracture, permanent disability, 
permanent disfigurement, or where medical expenses to that employee 
are in excess of $500.00.M This certainly was not the intention 
of the legislature. 
Furthermore, by paragraph (2) of the above quoted section, 
if the employer failed to provide No Fault Insurance, he would 
then "have no immunity from tort liability." This certainly was 
not the intention of the legislature as pertaining to employers. 
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Furthermore, to apply No Fault to plainti££fs employees 
would be discriminatory against other employees. Such application 
would mean that the employee who is injured while working on the 
dock is limited to Workmen Compensation benefits while the truck 
driver who is injured while sitting in his truck while it is 
being unloaded, would be allowed the benefits of No Fault which 
far exceed the benefits of Workmen Compensation. This would be 
discriminatory and probably unconstitutional. 
The Utah No Fault Act cannot apply against employers 
in behalf of employees who are covered by Workmen Compensation 
for the following basic reasons: 
1. To hold otherwise would run contrary to the 
Workmen Compensation Statutes of the State of Utah 
and the long historical precedence set by case law 
within the State of Utah, within the Federal system, 
and within other states. 
2. To hold otherwise would allow an employee to 
sue his employer in any case for death, dismemberment, 
fractures, permanent disability, permanent disfigure-
'•'" ment, or whenever medical expenses exceeded $500.00. 
3. To hold otherwise would allow different employees 
working for the same employer to receive different 
and unequal benefits. A truck driver would receive 
higher benefits than the dock worker. Such would be 
discriminatory and unconstitutional. 
4. To hold otherwise would allow an employee to sue his 
employer if the employer did not provide No Fault 
coverage. 
5. To hold otherwise would essentially eliminate the 
Workmen Compensation system as it applies to truck 
drivers or any other employees who drive for their 
employers since all such employees would seek the 
higher benefits of the No Fault Act. 
6. To hold otherwise would place the jurisdiction of 
such cases between employees and employers in the 
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District Courts of the state wherein now the District 
Courts have no jurisdiction in Workmen Compensation 
matters since such rests with the Industrial Commission 
with appeal directly to the Utah Supreme Court. 
It is respectfully submitted that an employee injured in 
an accident, while on the job, where his employer has provided 
Workmen Compensation coverage, has, as his only and exclusive 
remedy against his employer, the provisions of the Workmen 
Compensation Act. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 
NO FAULT ACT HAD NO APPLICATION TO ACCIDENTS 
OCCURRING OUTSIDE OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THAT 
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER HAD NO POWER TO EXTEND 
SUCH APPLICATION TO SUCH ACCIDENTS. 
The No Fault Act itself limits the application of the 
Act to accidents which occur within the State of Utah. The 
statute reads at Section 31-41-7 as follows: 
(1) The coverages described in Section 31-41-6 
shall be applicable to: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured 
when injured in an accident in this state in-
volving any motor vehicle. 
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile 
accidents occurring in this state sustained by 
any other natural person while occupying the 
described motor vehicle with the consent of the 
insured or while a pedestrian if injured in an 
accident involving the described motor vehicle. 
Therefore, the No Fault Act limits its applications to 
accidents which occur "in this state." 
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The Insurance Commissioner in its bulletin dated 
February, 1974 (Exhibit D-2) illegally expanded coverage to 
accidents occurring outside of the State of Utah and required 
insurance endorsements in regards thereto. The bulletin stated: 
To those automobile insurance companies that 
have not extended coverage against injury re-
sulting from accidents that happen outside the 
State of Utah, it will be required that the 
out-of-state extension endorsement of P.I.P. 
coverages be included as part of their No Fault 
coverage• 
Clearly, the above announcement by the Insurance Com-
missioner is not authorized by the statute, and goes beyond the 
limitations of the statute. The statute clearly limits the 
application of the No Fault Act to accidents which occur within 
the State of Utah. If such change is to be made to expand such 
coverage, such must come from the state legislature. 
73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedures, 
Section 59 states: 
Administrative officers and agencies must pursue 
their authority and act within the scope of their 
powers. There exercise of authority must be 
authorized by, and be in accordance with the require-
ments of, controlling provisions and principals of 
law. Such officers and agencies are bound by the 
terms of the statutes or regulations granting them 
their powers, and are required to act in accordance 
therewith and to keep within the limits of the 
powers and authority granted them. They are without 
power to act contrary to the provisions of the law 
or the clear legislative intendment, or to exceed 
the authority conferred on them by statute. They 
have no power to authorize or acquiesce in the 
doing of a thing unauthorized or forbidden by statute, 
and they may not violate a statutory mandate even 
though acting within the general jurisdiction conferred 
on them by statute. 
-22-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Neither the theoretical nor the practical effect 
of a proper adherence to the law should be of 
concern to administrative officers or agencies. 
They must follow statutory established standards 
and not their ideas of what would be charitable 
or equitable, and they may not ignore or transgress 
the statutory limitations on their power, even to 
accomplish what they may deem to be laudable ends. 
Their actions are valid only if they are within 
the limits of the powers granted them by the 
legislature; acts or orders which do not come 
clearly within the powers granted or which fall 
beyond the purview of the statute granting the 
agency or body its powers are not merely erroneous, 
but are void. However, the acts of a board in 
carrying out its authority should be liberally 
construed. 
In Piercey vs. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake 
City, 116 Utah 135, 208 P.2d 1123, the Utah Supreme Court recognize( 
the general law as stated above. In that case, the Civil Service 
Commission had statutory authority to hear appeals in regards to 
persons "removed from office" or "discharged11 from office or 
employment. In that case, a Salt Lake City fireman submitted 
his resignation under some pressure after having been arrested 
for drunkness. He later attempted to withdraw his resignation 
and then appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The Civil 
Service Commission held a hearing and ordered the fireman to 
be restored to his employment and ordered that his letter of 
resignation be voided. However, the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
the Civil Service Commission holding that the Commission did not 
have power in this regard. The Civil Service Commission derived 
its authority to hear appeals from a statute which read: 
All persons in the classified civil service may 
be removed from office or employment by the head 
of the department for misconduct, incompetency or 
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or failure to perform his duties or failure to 
observe properly the rules of the department, 
but subject to appeal by the aggrieved party 
to the Civil Service Commission. Any person 
discharged may within five days from the issuing 
by the head of the department of the order dis-
charging him appeal therefrom to the Civil 
Service Commission, which shall fully hear and 
determine the matter. The discharged person 
shall be entitled to appear in person and to 
have counsel and a public hearing. The finding 
and decision of the Civil Service Commission 
upon such hearing shall be certified to the 
head of the department from whose order the 
appeal is taken, and shall be final, and shall 
forthwith be enforced and followed by him. 
The Utah Supreme Court in holding that the Civil Service 
Commission had gone beyond its power stated: 
It is evident from what has been said that the 
Civil Service Commission was without jurisdiction 
to hear and determine the appeal brought by Fox 
because he resigned and was not removed from 
office or employment. . .the statute does not 
give the Commission the power or right to determine 
whether a person in the Civil Service who has 
resigned from his office or employment did so 
because of duress, coercion, or fear, brought 
upon him by the head of the department in which 
he is employed. The Civil Service Commission, 
like other tribunals of limited jurisdiction, 
can exercise only such powers as are conferred 
upon it by statute. (Piercey vs. Civil Service 
Commission of Salt Lake City, supraT) 
The No Fault Act, itself, gives the insurance department 
the power to "promulgate such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary for the purposes of this Act." U.C.A. 31-41-12. 
The purposes of this Act are to provide No Fault coverage 
for insureds or other natural persons occupying an insured vehicle 
when injured in an accident in this state* The Insurance Commis-
sioner may promulgate such rules and regulations as are reasonable 
unto this end but no further. The Insurance Commissioner does 
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not have the power to extend or expand the type of coverage, 
or the amounts to be realized, or the persons to be covered, 
or the limitations, or the territorial area to be covered. The 
Insurance Commissioner and Department of Insurance are without 
power to expand coverage to accidents outside of the State of 
Utah inasmuch as the state legislature in the passage of the 
No Fault Act stated such coverage to apply to accidents 
occurring in the State of Utah. 
If a person desires insurance coverage for accidents 
occurring outside of the State of Utah, such can be purchased 
from his insurance agent. 
It is respectfully submitted that the No Fault Act 
is limited to accidents occurring within the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that an employee who is 
injured on the job and who is protected by Workmen Compensation, 
has, as to his employer, only the exclusive remedy of Workmen 
Compensation and such employee has no remedy under the No Fault 
Act as to his employer. 
It is further submitted that the No Fault Laws of Utah 
apply only to accidents which occur within the State of Utah. 
It is further submitted that this matter was one for 
judicial determination. 
The lower Courtfs judgment should be affirmed. 
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